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COMPARATIVE ANTITRUST FEDERALISM: 




 This well written, short book compares the role of federalism in the competition law of 
the European Union and the United States.  Both of these systems are “federal,” of course, 
because both have individual nation-states (Europe) or states (US) with their own individual 
competition provisions, but also an overarching competition law that applies to the entire group.  
This entails that a certain amount of cooperation is necessary with respect to both territorial 
reach and substantive coverage. 
Cengiz book reaches significantly beyond legal analysis to examine the economics of 
federalism and also the political processes that characterize competition policy federalism in the 
EU and the US.  As Cengiz observes, multi-level political regimes present a form of diversity 
that “stands both as an advantage and a disadvantage” for good governance.  On the one hand, 
this type of diversity contributes to innovation, flexibility and responsiveness; on the other, it can 
jeopardize consistency and increase both enforcement costs and compliance costs. (p. 1).  After 
presenting basic issues and a framework for analysis in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 develops two 
alternative models of federalism.  The first one is “regulatory competition,” which treats 
federalist systems as laboratories in which differing ideas can be tried out and tested against each 
other.  The second is a model of “policy networks” which emphasizes cooperation rather than 
competition among the different governments in a federal system. 
                                            
1 FIRAT CENGIZ, ANTITRUST FEDERALISM IN THE EU AND THE US.  London & New York: 
Routledge, 2012.  isbn: 978-0-415-67463.  234 pages inc. index. 
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Cengiz distinguishes among “markets,” “hierarchies,” and “networks” as forms of 
federalism.  Markets are the least centralized and have more episodic, or ad hoc, control.  As a 
result they are more prone to policy “races.”  A “race to the bottom” occurs when the smaller 
sovereigns compete in a larger market and attempt to reduce costs in a way that would be 
suboptimal if it were forced to internalize all relevant costs.  She offers as an example United 
States corporate law, in which state chartering provides the legal corporate governance 
framework, even for companies that operate nationally or internationally.  As a result they might 
race with each other to provide less supervision or rules that give greater discretion to 
management then would be optimal if all of the relevant stakeholders were located within the 
sovereign’s own boundaries.   This might happen, for example, when shareholders are dispersed 
much more widely than the jurisdiction creating the corporate law mechanism.  One result of this 
race in the United States was that Delaware, a rather small state, has succeeded in claiming an 
unduly large share of the charters of multistate and multinational corporations.   Whether this has 
truly been a “race to the bottom” is debatable, however.  Others have argued that the race that 
allegedly characterized Delaware corporate law was in reality a race to the top, which Delaware 
won by providing the most efficient structures for corporate governance.  Cengiz argues that 
legal policy can in fact be structured in ways to ensure that the “races” that occur among 
sovereigns in a federal setting are in fact races to the top rather than races to the bottom. 
 Cengiz concludes that the EU and US systems are similar in that both begin with a set of 
system-wide policies that are broad and strong, with internal unification as a primary objective.  
Where they tend to differ is in areas governing conflicts between the laws at the different levels.  
Here, the US system is more structured and hierarchical, while the EU system tends to rely more 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070079
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on cooperation.  Cengiz describes the US as emerging from “bottom up collective action,” while 
that in the EU is more cooperative.  At the same time, however, within the US all of the 
individual antitrust authorities are thought of as enjoying equal authority throughout their 
respective domains, while the central authority in the EU operates more as a network manager. 
 Cengiz ultimately finds the regulatory competition model to be inferior to the network 
model of federalism.  The regulatory competition model most generally evaluates policies of 
individual states by permitting people to vote with their feet.  She concludes that the regulatory 
competition model does not provide a “suitable template” for competition policy, mainly because 
of the impact of spillovers and also its competitive nature.  Such systems are more prone to 
“overcrowding,” in the sense of inconsistency or unnecessary complexity in compliance with the 
commands of differing sovereigns.  In contrast to the market-based competitive approach, 
network approaches toward federalism tend to be more stable and to provide fewer opportunities 
for conflict.  At the same time, however, networks are “at least theoretically prone to conflicts 
and deadlocks” as well. (p. 37).  They are crucially dependent on the continuous exchange and 
updating of information, while competitive federalism actually produces motives for individual 
sovereigns to withhold information from one another, or at least to go it alone without making 
engagement with other portions of the system an essential attribute of enforcement decisions. 
 Cengiz also finds differing approaches to network federalism within the EU, and in 
particular distinguishes British, German and Dutch approaches.  The British use an “Interest 
intermediation” approach, the Germans a “Governance” approach, and the Dutch a “public 
management” approach. [p. 41] 
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 In general, it seems, the European approach to federalism reflects a more managerial, or 
regulatory, conception of competition policy, in distinction from the more market driven 
selective interventionist approach that characterizes the American system.  The American 
approach to federalism is more consistent with market-driven systems generally, in which the 
sovereign intervenes only selectively and less day-to-day cooperation is required.  As Cengiz 
observes, “From a general perspective, regulatory competition as a model does not reflect the 
complexities of modern multi-level polities,” but is more likely to reflect individual policies and 
subsequent efforts to harmonize them.  As a result, competitive networks are more likely to 
become subject to excessive, overlapping or sometimes conflicting regulations.  Another 
problem she observes and that those of us in the United States understand all too well is that the 
division between federal and state regulatory power contemplated in the United States 
Constitution, a 225 year old document that did not have modern competition policy in mind, is 
both too complex and too ambiguous.  The line between federal power to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause and limitations on state power under the “dormant” Commerce Clause 
remains elusive, is constantly changing, and its location is often driven more by ideology than 
sound economic reasoning. 
 One additional idiosyncrasy of American antitrust federalism is the expansive set of 
private rights created by United States law as well as the antitrust law of most states.  Some 
ninety percent of antitrust actions in the United States are filed by private persons, and 
historically they have not effected any coherent policy.  While many of these cases follow after 
government enforcement actions, such as price-fixing conspiracies, many others do not.  Further, 
some of them proceed under both federal and state law in substantive areas that the federal 
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government has largely abandoned, such as price discrimination or resale price maintenance.  
Otherwise they take advantage of state statutes that are substantively quite different from federal 
law, such as state provisions prohibiting noncompetition agreements or “below cost’ pricing but 
defining cost and illegality in ways that are very different than federal law defines them. 
 Cengiz concludes by finding some similarity but also important differences between EU 
and US antitrust.  For example, “in contrast to the deferential application of preemption doctrine 
to conflict of antitrust in the US, in the EU the strict principles of primacy prevents 
experimentations in competition policy at the national level.”  In this reviewer’s opinion that 
statement contains a great deal of truth.  In the United States intervention tends to be episodic 
and sometimes unexpected.  Particularly with respect to government enforcement, intervention 
only occurs after a practice has been going on for some time. 
 Apropos of this, United States antitrust federalism is subject to a highly complicating 
factor  -- namely, the state action “exemption,” which gives states virtual carte blanche to 
regulate activity within their boundaries (and even a certain amount outside of their boundaries), 
provided that they have articulated their desire to do so and that they actively supervise any 
private conduct that the regulatory regime authorizes.  In a very few situations, such as 
professional sports, the courts have found an overriding need for uniformity that preempts 
individual state prerogatives.  Aside from these situations, however, the state power is broad, 
limited mainly by preemptive federal regulation aside from the antitrust laws, such as federal 
policy regarding intellectual property rights, labor, securities, civil rights, or environmental 
protection.  For example, state law in the United States has the power to immunize 
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anticompetitive mergers, even mergers to monopoly, if the state has clearly articulated this 
policy as its goal.  Federal antitrust law also routinely approves monopoly franchises to 
companies in competitively structured industries, such as taxicab transportation or waste 
disposal, in which competition is clearly in consumers’ interest. 
 This is an excellent book, of interest to academicians or legislators as much as practicing 
lawyers in areas of federal regulatory conflict. 
Herbert Hovenkamp 
May 2012 
Iowa City Iowa 
